Gay Politics Goes Mainstream: Democrats, Republicans, and Same-Sex Relationships, with Raquel Fernández (NYU) • December 2022

Abstract: The last few decades witnessed a dramatic change in public opinion towards gay people. We show that this process was initiated by a sharp increase in the approval of same-sex relationships in 1992-'93, following the debate on whether gay people could serve openly in the military. Using a difference-in-difference empirical strategy, we study the hypothesis that the greater salience of gay-related issues during this period initiated a process of cultural change. We show that greater exposure to the gay population, measured in a variety of ways, led to a greater increase in approval. These results, we demonstrate, cannot be explained by the popular view that the increased acceptance of same-sex relationships reflected expanding liberalism and civil liberties.

Political Dynasties and Female Political Representation in the Philippines, with Julien Labonne (University of Oxford) and Pablo Querubin (NYU) • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 182, 212-228, February 2021

Abstract: We investigate the effect of term limits on female political representation. Using data from Philippine municipalities where strict term limits have been in place since 1987, we show that term limits led to a large increase in the number of women running and winning in mayoral elections. However, we show that this increase is entirely driven by female relatives of the term-limited incumbents. We further show that the differential gender impact of this policy is driven by political dynasties' adaptive strategies to stay in power.

Research Brief in Economic Policy No. 2014, May 13, 2020, Cato Institute

Information Aggregation in a Financial Market with General Signal Structure, with Youcheng Lou (Chinese Academy of Science), Debraj Ray (NYU), Duan Li (City University of Hong Kong) and Shouyang Wang (Chinese Academy of Science) • Journal of Economic Theory, 183, pp.594-624, September 2019

Abstract: We study a financial market with asymmetric, multidimensional trader signals that have general correlation structure. Each of a continuum of traders belongs to one of finitely many "information groups." There is a multidimensional aggregate signal for each group. Each trader observes an idiosyncratic signal about the fundamental, built from this group signal. Correlations across group signals are arbitrary. Several existing models serve as special cases, and new applications become possible. We establish existence and regularity of linear equilibrium, and demonstrate that the equilibrium price aggregates information perfectly as noise trade vanishes.

Redistributive Choices and Income Inequality: Experimental Evidence for Income as a Signal of Deservingness, with Laura Gee (Tufts University) and Marco Migueis (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) • Experimental Economics, 20(4), 894-923, February 2017

Abstract: We explore the relation between redistribution choices, source of income, and pre-redistribution inequality. Previous studies find that when income is earned through work there is less support for redistribution than when income is determined by luck. Using a lab experiment, we vary both the income-generating process (luck vs. performance) and the level of inequality (low vs. high). We find that an increase in inequality has less impact on redistribution choices when income is earned through performance than when income results from luck. This result is likely explained by individuals using income differences as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness. If people believe income inequality increases as a result of performance rather than luck, then they are likely to believe the poor deserve to stay poor and the rich deserve to stay rich.